So the question is not whether they should use them. But only: from whom they buy them.
What do you call it when the police have been in the dark for decades because they can’t track down a former RAF terrorist even though she lives in the middle of Berlin – and then a journalist comes along, with a computer program for a measly 17.99 euros, and solves the case in half an hour? That’s how it was in the case of former RAF terrorist Daniela Klette. The journalist here was Canadian Michael Colborne from the research platform Bellingcat. He used the facial recognition program Pimeyes to briefly search the internet. Et voilà – a hit. The former RAF terrorist, who was living under a false name, was found on Facebook.
What is clear: the technology is there, it is cheap, and it works. The police should be allowed to use it. So the debate must not revolve around the whether, but the how. Who supplies the software? Under what conditions? And how is data protection ensured?
Opponents of facial recognition warn of a surveillance state. This concern must be taken seriously. But the alternative is not freedom, but the powerlessness of investigators. When a journalist with a 17.99-euro program achieves more than the entire police force, then something is wrong with the equipment of the security authorities.
Policymakers must act now: the police need clear rules for the use of facial recognition software – and the budget to buy it. Not from dubious providers, but from certified, data-protection-compliant companies. The Klette case is a lesson: those who have the wrong tools lose time. And in the fight against terror and serious crime, time can be a matter of life and death.
Source: www.sueddeutsche.de
